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Society depends upon its police departments to maintain order, prevent and detect crime, and enforce the law. The ability
of any police department to succeed in these tasks depends upon
the ability of each of its individual police officers to do so. Society therefore has an interest in monitoring the behavior of each
of its police officers to see if he or she has any physical, mental,
or moral flaws which make the officer incapable of carrying out
his or her charge. However, this interest may sometimes conflict
with the police officer's privacy interest, as well as with society's
interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens.
For the most part, the law's attempts to govern this conflict
have been far from satisfying. Rules and regulations that govern
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police officers' off-duty conduct are often broadly worded, usually prohibiting any "misconduct" or "conduct unbecoming an
officer." 1 Consequently, issues concerning regulation of the private, off-duty, activities of police officers arise frequently, with
the lower courts divided both in their analytic approaches and
results. While several lower courts have upheld the removal, suspension, or demotion of police officers for off-duty conduct involving such things as adultery,2 transvestite behavior,3 and
spending the night with a co-employee,4 others have not allowed
such state intrusion into the private lives of public employees,
often basing this decision on some constitutional right of privacy.~ Such ad hoc treatment is a source of injustice to the police officer who may find him or herself dismissed, suspended, or
demoted, without warning, for engaging in conduct that most
people are free to engage in without consequence. 6
This Note proposes a framework for dealing with problems in
this area in a manner which best balances the competing interests involved. It argues that, while there is no explicit constitu1. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Greensboro, 452 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1971) (citing a
Greensboro regulation prohibiting conduct "unbecoming an officer and a gentleman");
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Livingston, 22 Ariz. App. 183, 185, 525 P.2d 949, 950 (1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 951 (1975) (citing Tucson Police Department Regulation § 6-8.401(7)
prohibiting "conduct unbecoming an officer"); Fabio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 489 Pa. 309,
313 n.l, 414 A.2d 82, 84 n.1 (1980) (citing art. I,§ 1.75 of the Philadelphia Police Department Duty Manual which provides for dismissal for "conduct unbecoming an officer");
Lubbock v. Estrello, 581 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (citing Lubbock Civil
Service Rule XIV, § 54 providing for dismissal or suspension for the commission of acts
showing lack of good moral character and conduct prejudicial to good order).
For statutory prohibitions, see 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 46190(4) (Purdon 1966)
(prohibiting "immorality . . . or conduct unbecoming an officer"); IND. CODE § 18-1-11-3
(1976 ed.) (prohibiting "conduct unbecoming an officer"); lowA CODE ANN. § 400.19
(West 1976) (prohibiting "misconduct"); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-147 (West 1980)
(prohibiting "misconduct").
2. E.g., Wilson v. Swing, 463 F. Supp. 555 (M.D.N.C. 1978); Faust v. Police Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 22 Pa. Commw. 123, 347 A.2d 765 (1975).
,
3. E.g., Etscheid v. Police Bd., 47 Ill. App. 2d 124, 197 N.E.2d 484 (1964).
4. E.g., Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 404
(1983).
5. See, e.g., Briggs v. North Muskegon Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mich.
1983) (holding that dismissal of part-time police officer, because he was cohabiting with a
married woman not his wife, violated his right of privacy protected by the constitution);
Swope v. Bratton, 541 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (finding that a police officer's relationship with a female employee of the police department is protected by a constitutional right of privacy); Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (holding that a police department policy requiring officers, upon penalty of losing
their jobs, to answer all questions asked in an official investigation, even though questions have no bearing upon officer's job performance, violates the officer's constitutionally protected right of privacy).
6. This Note considers only the regulation of otherwise lawful off-duty activities. See
infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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tional guarantee of privacy, the state is not free to regulate all
aspects of a police officer's otherwise legal, off-duty, sexual activity. Part I of the Note examines several possible sources of a
constitutional right of privacy. It concludes that, although many
of the courts which invalidate state regulation of police officers'
off-duty sexual activity do so on the basis of some constitutional
right of privacy, any implied fundamental right of sexual privacy
should be construed narrowly to protect only those activities
within the realm of a family relationship. Part II analyzes an
alternative basis for protecting this type of behavior. It asserts
that prohibiting a police officer from engaging in off-duty sexual
conduct in which the general public may otherwise engage violates equal protection. Finally, Part III argues that even if a sufficient state interest can be found to validate the separate treatment of police officers and other citizens for legislative purposes,
a broad "conduct unbecoming an officer" standard is too vague
to survive as a sufficient prohibition against off-duty, "immoral"
behavior.
I.

DUE PROCESS AND THE INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO SEXUAL
PRIVACY

Many courts have not hesitated to permit state intrusion into
the private activities of police offiers. 7 On the other hand, several courts have invalidated state regulation of the off-duty, consensual, sexual conduct of police officers on the basis of some
constitutional right of privacy. 8 The determination of which is
the correct view of the right of privacy establishes the proper
level of protection to be afforded police officers from state intrusion into their private activities.
The Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of privacy. 9 However, the Supreme Court has, for over a decade, recognized a right of privacy, founded in the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty. 10 Consequently, the degree to
which this judicially-recognized right of privacy is considered
7. See, e.g., Shawgo v. Spadlin, 701 F.2d 470, 479 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
404 (1983) (declaring that cohabitation by, or romantic involvement between, a
subordinate and a superior officer is within the scope of state personnel regulation and
not protected by the Constitution); Wilson v. Swing, 463 F. Supp. 555, 563 (M.D.N.C.
1978) (indicating that adulterous conduct is protected by neither the constitutional right
of association nor the analogous right of privacy).
8. See supra note 5.
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
10. Id. at 152-54; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977).
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fundamental governs the extent to which the state may regulate
the off-duty private sexual behavior of public employees. 11
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has yet to answer definitively whether, and to what extent, the Constitution prohibits
state regulation of the private sexual behavior of consenting
adults. 12 Furthermore, the Court has, at different times, espoused different views as to how fundamental the right of privacy actually is. For example, the Court has stated that only
fundamental rights are included in the guarantee of personal
privacy. 13 Yet it has also declared that the right to be free from
governmental intrusion into one's privacy, except in very limited
circumstances, is indeed a fundamental right. 14 Which of these
two categories privacy actually belongs in-fundamental right or
merely protector of fundamental rights-depends on the ultimate source of the individual's right of privacy. Consequently,
an effective determination of whether a constitutional right of
privacy extends to the private, consensual, sexual activities of
off-duty police officers requires examination of those constitutional provisions from which such a right might arise.
If a right of privacy does exist, it is most likely either a pe11. Under modern due process analysis, deprivation of a liberty which lacks textual
support ordinarily will be found constitutional so long as the deprivation bears a rational
relationship to the achievement of some permissible legislative objective. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1029-30 (1979);
Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy By the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV.
173, 195-96 (1980); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). However,
regulations limiting "fundamental" rights must be justified by a "compelling" state interest. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citing Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.,
395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); and Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)). Classification of a right as fundamental or not generally determines the outcome of a constitutional challenge to state regulation of that
right, because rebuttal of the presumption of validity is generally not possible for regulation of non-fundamental liberties. Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLUM. L. REV.
1410, 1426 (1974); Lupu, supra, at 1030.
12. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977); Briggs v. North
Muskegon Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585, 589 (W.D. Mich 1983).
While several of the lower courts have recognized no constitutional protection of sexual conduct outside marriage, see, e.g., Baron v. Meloni, 556 F. Supp. 796 (W.D.N.Y.
1983); Suddarth v. Slane, 539 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Va. 1982); Johnson v. San Jacinto
Junior College, 498 F. Supp. 555 (S.D. Tex. 1980), others have reached the opposite conclusion, see, e.g., State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976); State v. Saunders, 75
N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) ("[O]nly personal rights that can be
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit' in the concept of ordered liberty . . . are included in
this guarantee of personal privacy.").
14. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("[F]undamental is the right to be
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into
one's privacy.").
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ripheral right, emanating from several of the specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights, or it is encompassed in the ninth amendment's protection of certain rights retained by the people. As
will shortly be shown, neither source seems particularly wellsuited to protect the off-duty sexual behavior of public employees. Hence, decisions striking down state regulation of police officers' off-duty activities on the grounds that such regulations
impose on the officer's right of privacy are inadequate; rather an
alternative basis should be utilized and two possibilities are examined in Parts II and III of this Note. 111
A.

Penumbral Protection of the Right of Privacy

The "penumbras" or shadows which emanate from specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights compose the first potential
source of the constitutional right of privacy. This ancillary theory of the right of privacy was first recognized in Grisl.J.!old v.
Connecticut, 16 in which the Supreme Court adamantly advocated the sanctity of the marital bedroom, 17 and implicity categorized any private, consensual, sexual relations between married persons as within the "zone of privacy" protected against
unwarranted government interference. 18 While the result in
Griswold may be correct, its logic remains unconvincing.
15. An additional possible protection of police officers' off-duty sexual activities is the
right of association arising out of the first amendment, applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment. For example, in Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1984), the
court, stating that "the first amendment freedom of association applies not only to situations where an advancing of common beliefs occurs, but also to purely social and personal associations," id. at 1544, held that the police department violated a police officer's
constitutionally protected freedom of association when it discharged him solely for dating the daughter of a convicted felon who was alledgedly a key figure in organized crime.
Contrary to Wilson, however, it is arguable that the right of association provides limited
protection, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-23, at 700-01 (1978), and preserves nothing more than an individual's "right to join with others to pursue goals independently protected by the first amendment." Id. at 702 (emphasis in original). Thus a
police officer's purely social off-duty activities would not be protected. This view is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974) which may be read in conjunction with Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977), as allowing local governments to assert "a general power to dictate the intimate composition of domestic associations," L. TRIBE, supra § 15-18, at 977, at least
when no traditional family relationship is involved.
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a statute that made use of contraceptives a
criminal offense, since such regulation would be an unconstitutional invasion of the right
of privacy of married persons).
17. Id. at 485-86.
18. Henkin, supra note 11, at 1424 ("What is barred to 'intrusion' [in Griswold] is
not the bedroom but ... the 'marital privacy ... .' ").
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Speaking for the majority, Justice Douglas declared that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have "penumbras" or
shadows which emanate from those guarantees in order to "give
them life and substance."19· According to Douglas, the emanations from thefirst, third, fourth, and fifth amendments create a
right of privacy sufficient to protect the sexual activities of married couples.-20' For a "penumbra" theory to have meaning, however, the penumbra! right must have some connection to the
specific guarantee from which it emanates; 21 otherwise, the
courts may arbitrarily create rights never conferred by the
Framers.
Yet the amendments Douglas mentioned as creating an ancillary right of privacy have little to do with the right of married
people to be unregulated in their sexual relations. 22 Prior to
Griswold, any right of privacy emanating from explicit constitutional guarantees might reasonably have been found to protect
one of two distinct interests, 23 the individual's interest in seclusion,2• or his interest in secrecy. 25 By invalidating a statute
prohibiting use of contraceptives, the Court in Griswold recognized a completely new privacy interest: the general right to be
free from governmental regulation 26-put simply, a "right to be
let alone." 27 Yet this interest emanates from no specific constitutional guarantee.
In short, Griswold's penumbra! theory lacks a legitimate ha19. 381 U.S. at 484. Note that, under this view, privacy would be categorized merely
as a protector of otherwise fundamental rights.
20. 381 U.S. at 484-85.
21. Posner, supra note 11, at 191.
22. 381 U.S. at 528-29 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
23. Posner, supra note 11, at 174.
24. This consists of the right to be free from official intrusion, protected, for example,
by the third amendment's prohibition of quartering troops in private homes during
peacetime without the owner's consent, U.S. CONST. amend. Ill, and the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure, U.S. CONST. amend. IV. One commentator has said that this aspect of privacy affords the individual the opportunity "to
think, plan and reflect without frequent interruption." Posner, supra note 11, at 174.
25. This consists of the individual's right to conceal selected aspects of his or her
activity from the government, protected, for example, by the fifth amendment's selfincrimination clause, U.S CONST. amend V.
26. Henkin, supra note 11, at 1424-25. This right to be free of government regulation
can be distinguished from the right to be free of government intrusion, supra note 24.
Through the right to be free of government intrusion the individual claims the right to
do unimpeded in private whatever he is otherwise legally allowed to do. Through the
right to be free of government regulation he claims a right to do in private something he
is otherwise prohibited from doing. See Posner, supra note 11, at 193.
27. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (quoting Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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sis. 28 The decision prohibits governmental regulation of certain
private sexual activities but provides no adequate rationale for
how the Court reached its result to help establish the outer
bounds of this prohibition. 29 Assuming that post-Griswold a
state may still punish at least some offenses committed in private,30 the holding in Griswold provides limited guidance and
should be narrowly construed to provide fundamental protection
only of marital privacy. 31
Consequently, the penumbra theory of privacy has little value
as a shield to protect public employees from state intrusion into
their private sex lives. Indeed, if it were not for Justice Douglas's cryptic opinion in Griswold, the penumbra theory would
not serve as a legitimate source of any constitutional right of
privacy, and the holding in Griswold may adequately guard only
against state intrusion into off-duty, marital, sexual activity. 32
28. As one commentator notes, "when the Constitution sought to protect private
rights it specified them; that it explicitly protects some elements of privacy, but not
others, suggests that it did not mean to protect those not mentioned." Henkin, supra
note 11, at 1422; accord Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 508-10 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
29. In the course of his opinion, Justice Douglas never indicates which, if any, of the
amendments he mentions is infringed by the Connecticut statute. 381 U.S. at 528 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
30. 381 U.S. at 530 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("I suppose ... that even after (Griswold] a State can constitutionally still punish at least some offenses which are not committed in public."); accord Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 n.11 (1969).
31. The Court's post-Griswold language seemingly indicates a retreat from the view
of privacy as being based solely on the marital relationship. For example, in declaring a
state prohibition of contraceptives to unmarried persons impermissible, the Court stated
that,
the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). However, the decision in Eisenstadt was
not based on a finding that unmarried persons have a fundamental right to use contraception but rather on the irrationality of the distinction between married and unmarried
couples for this purpose. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. Indeed, the court
in Eisenstadt clearly recognized that "in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the martial relationship." 405 U.S. at 453.
32. One indication that the courts have read the decision to provide fundamental
protection at least to marital privacy is the fact that "[t)he current trend of case law
indicates that anti-sodomy legislation no longer is applicable to married couples, regardless of whether the wording of the state statute has been changed to accord with Griswold." Note, Right of Privacy-Consensual Sodomy and the Choice of a Moral Doctrine: New York's Permissive Position, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 75, 80 (1982) (footnote
omitted).
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Natural Right Theory of Privacy

A second possible source of the constitutional right of privacy,
the ninth amendment, provides that "[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." 33 This language has
led some to conclude that the Framer!;! intended to announce the
principle that, in addition to those fundamental rights explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution, there exist other, unmentioned,
fundamental rights that are also protected against unwarranted
governmental interference. 34
Acknowledgment that unmentioned natural rights are protected as fundamental, however, does not identify these natural
rights. Even proponents of this view of the ninth amendment
recognize that judges cannot categorize an unspecified right as
fundamental based merely on their personal discretion. 35 Unfortunately, the factors that elevate an unspecified right to fundamental status are not clearly articulated. It has been said, however, that courts must inquire whether the right "is of such a
character that it cannot be denied without violating those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions' . . . . " 36 With this amorphous view in mind, the following sections examine several possible formulations of a natural right protection of sexual
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
34. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965) (Goldberg, J. concurring); accord United Mine Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-95 (1947). Justice Goldberg's
examination of the history of the ninth amendment found that "[i]t was proffered to
quiet expressed fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently
broad to cover all essential rights and that the specific mention of certain rights would
be interpreted as a denial that others were protected." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-89
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). Hence, in Justice Goldberg's opinion, the
ninth amendment supports the view that the liberty protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments includes rights not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. Id. at
493. This position lends support to those who insist that "an intense and widely shared
adherence to natural rights ideas by the Constitution's framers led them to neglect more
specific mention of rights deemed too obvious to require elaboration." L. TRIBE, supra
note 15, § 15-3, at 894.
35. 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J. concurring) ("In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions.").
36. Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)). The traditions and collective conscience of the country may also establish a right as fundamental, id. (citing
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)), but the impracticality of applying this
test-i.e. how can the court determine the collective conscience?-renders it nothing
more than a goal to be approximated.
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privacy. 37
1. Right to be free from unwarranted governmental regulation of morality- The Supreme Court has long recognized that
the police power may be exercised to preserve and protect public
morals. 38 Some courts, however, distinguish between regulation
of public morality and regulation of private morality. 39 Implicitly recognizing a natural right to be free of unwarranted regulation of private morality, these courts find regulation of private
activity for reasons of public morality inappropriate for at least
two reasons. First, what one does in private, by definition, generally will not come before the public eye; therefore, government
interference does not advance the cause of public morality but
merely restricts individual conduct and imposes concepts of private morality chosen by the government.-' 0 Second, even if it is
possible for the public to ascertain what one does in private, infringement of constitutionally protected rights cannot be justified by general community disapproval of the protected conduct,
because constitutional protection of individual liberties intentionally prevents majoritarian coercion. 41
37. While some claim that natural rights analysis has become simply a "historical
curiosity," L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 15-3, at 894, discussion of natural rights do arise in
opinions of several Justices. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J. concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541-42 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United Mine
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-95 (1947). Furthermore, if the Framers did not intend the ninth amendment to be a meaningless tautology, see, e.g., Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) ("It cannot be presumed that any
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect."), it must serve as the guardian of otherwise unmentioned constitutional rights. Therefore, it becomes necessary to
determine whether the Framer's included the right of sexual privacy as one so obvious as
to require no elaboration. See supra note 34.
38. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). This power has been justified on
the grounds that the destruction of morality renders the power of government invalid,
since government is, in essence, no more than public order. Kingsley Int'! Pictures Corp.
v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 4 N.Y.2d 349, 359, 151 N.E.2d 197, 205, 175
N.Y.S.2d 39, 47, rev'd on other grounds, 360 U.S. 684 (1958).
39. See, e.g., People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 491-92, 415 N.E.2d 936, 943, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947, 953 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (finding state statute prohibiting private acts of consensual sodomy among unmarried adults violated defendant's
right of privacy and could not be justified as a valid exercise of police power authorized
for the preservation of morality, since "[n]o substantial prospect of harm from consensual sodomy nor any threat to public-as opposed to private-morality has been
shown").
40. Id. at 489-90; State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 218-20, 381 A.2d 333 (1977).
41. Briggs v. North Muskegon Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585, 590-91 (W.D. Mich.
1983); see also People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 490, 415 N.E.2d 936, 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d
947, 952 (1980) ("disapproval by a majority of the populace ... may not substitute for
the required demonstration of a valid basis for intrusion by the State in an area ...
protected [by the constitutional] right of privacy"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981);
accord Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1971).
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Note the circular quality of this reasoning: an activity is constitutionally protected because it is done in private and consequently does not affect public morality; therefore, even if the activity is somehow disclosed to the public, it is still protected
against majoritarian coercion by the right of privacy, though it
may now have an effect on public morality.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court seemingly adopted at least
a limited version of the public/private morality distinction in
Stanley v. Georgia. 42 The Court held that, although obscenity is
not protected by the first amendment, the mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a
crime. 43 While some have read this decision as protecting only
the right to receive information and ideas, 44 the Court later expressly denied this view and reaffirmed its belief in the constitutional protection of the privacy of the home. 45
Yet Stanley does not stand for the proposition, as some would
argue, that the right of privacy includes a ban on criminal sanctions against any voluntary act done in private which does not
harm others. 46 In addition to its interest in preventing an individual from harming others, a government also has an interest in
protecting both society at large47 and, to a certain extent, the
individual himself. 48 Therefore, just as the government may regulate the private use of drugs to prevent physical and mental
42. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
43. Id. at 559-62.
44. See People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 501 n.2, 415 N.E.2d 936, 948 n.2, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947, 958-59 n.2 (1980) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981); Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 374-75, 430 A.2d 570, 575 (1981). This view is
supported by the Stanley opinion:
What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the State . . . to make
possession of other items . . . a crime. Our holding in the present case turns
upon the Georgia statute's infringement of fundamental liberties protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. No First Amendment rights are involved
in most statutes making mere possession criminal.
394 U.S. at 568 n.11.
45. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973) (If there is a first amendment "penumbra" protecting otherwise unprotected obscene material, it would not have
been necessary to decide Stanley on the "basis of the 'privacy of the home' which was
hardly more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is his castle.' ") (quoting Stanley,
394 U.S. at 564).
46. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 759 (2d ed. 1983)
("Such a right would be based on the philosophy which underlies . . . any true right to
privacy; that society may not limit individual freedom unless it does so to prevent an
individual from harming others.").
47. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 57-58 ("[L)egitimate state interests
. . . include the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community
environment . . . . ").
48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 15-12.
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damage to the individual, 49 it should also be allowed to regulate
private sexual relations to the extent such regulation addresses
the social problems of illegitimacy and venereal disease and attempts to prevent potential destructive effects on the familial
structure.
Stanley affords only limited protection of sexual privacy. The
decision merely defends acts performed in the privacy of the
home against government regulations that are based strictly on
morality grounds. Yet most regulations of sexual behavior are
based at least in part on public welfare grounds, and Stanley
clearly does not elevate to fundamental right status the ability
to do in private an activity that could otherwise be regulated by
the state. 110
In short, to the extent that men create governments to regulate, there can be no natural fundamental right to go unregulated, 111 and in the absence of such a natural right, the ninth
amendment will not adequately protect against state intrusion
into the private sexual activities of police officers.
2. Right of privacy in activities associated with the familyPrivate protection for certain aspects of the family relationship
constitutes a more likely candidate for natural right status. For
example, the Supreme Court quite clearly afforded strict protection to the marital privacy. 112 The Court has implied that this
protection does not arise out of any explicit constitutional guarantee, but rather is one of the natural rights of man. 113 Even
strong advocates of the view that the ninth amendment fundamentally protects constitutionally unmentioned natural rights
are quick to concede that such protection doe$ not extend to
sexual conduct in and of itself.Ci" Rather, the ninth amendment
49. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977). But see Ravin v. State, 537
P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (holding that individuals have a right under both the federal and
Alaska constitutions to possess marijuana for private, noncommercial use in one's home,
since such use does not seriously interfere with the health, safety, rights, and privileges
of others or with the public welfare).
50. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11 ("What we have said in no way infringes upon
the power of the State or federal government to make possession of other items, such as
narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime.").
51. See, e.g., id.; accord Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) ("The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right" of the individual to do with her body as she
pleases.).
52. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) ("The very idea [of intrusion
into the precincts of the marital bedroom] is repulsive to notions of privacy surrounding
the marriage relationship.").
53. Id. at 486 ("We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights . . . .
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred.").
54. See, e.g., id. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (it is constitutionally permissible to
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protects the fundamental right of privacy in the marital relation,
"a relation as old and as fundamental as our entire
civilization. " 55
The Supreme Court has strengthened this argument for natural right protection of activities associated with the family by
extending the guarantee of personal privacy to marriage itself, 56
procreation, 57 contraception, 58 family relationships, 59 child rearing and education, 60 and abortion. 61 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has come extremely close to acknowledging a natural right of
family privacy, rooted in the nation's history and tradition. 62
Hence, while there may be no general right to be free from governmental regulation, 63 the ninth amendment does encompass
the right of family privacy and strict scrutiny should therefore
be applied to all governmental regulation of "family" activities.
In sum, although many of the courts which invalidate state
regulation of police officers' off-duty, sexual activity do so on the
basis of a due process violation of the individual's right of privacy, the protection that may validly be offered is slim. Under
either a penumbra! or natural right theory, no all-encompassing
fundamental right of privacy exists, and due process, therefore,
cannot afford privacy any protection other than in the realm of
the family relationship. This does not mean, however, that the
state is free to regulate all activity of the off-duty police officer
short of intrusion into a family relationship for, as Part II of this
Note explains, prohibiting a police officer from engaging in offduty conduct in which the general public may engage violates
the equal protection clause.
prohibit adultery and fornication); id. at 498-99 (a state may properly regulate sexual
promiscuity and misconduct).
55.

Id. at 495-96, 499.

56. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967)).
57.

Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942)).

58.

Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972)).

59.

Id. at 153 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).

60. Id. (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) and Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
61.

Id. at 154.

62. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) ("[T)he liberty
interest in family privacy has its source, . . . not in state law, but in intrinsic human
rights, as they have been understood in 'this Nation's history and tradition.'") (citation
omitted); see also supra note 53.
63.

See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
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AN EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF SEXUAL PRIVACY

Like the protection afforded by due process,6" that arising out
of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause has traditionally been effectuated by means of a two-tier test. In general, a court will uphold a challenged law that it finds to be reasonably related to a legitimate government concern. 66 When,
however, the challanged law intrudes upon a fundamental right,
it faces heightened scrutiny and will be invalidated "unless
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest. " 66
Both courts 67 and commentators68 have expressed severe dissatisfaction with the rigid two-tier format of equal protection
analysis. Under this format, initial determination of the standard to be applied effectively determines the final outcome. 69
Growing dissatisfaction with the two-tier format has not led the
Supreme Court to abandon use of either the strict scrutiny or
rational basis test. The Court has, however, shown a willingness
to expand the contours of the equal protection clause by adding,
in certain circumstances, a more flexible balancing test which re64. See supra note 11.
65. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); see also L. TRIBE supra
note 15, §§ 16-2 to -5.
Reflecting the broad deference afforded legislatures by the courts, most laws challenged under this test are upheld. See L. TRIBE supra note 15, § 16-2. This is especially
evident from the Court's rejection of equal protection challenges to economic and social
legislation. See, e.g., Cleland v. National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213 (1978) (per
curiam); Idaho Dep't of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100 (1977) (per curiam); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). Consequently, the rational basis test requires only
"minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Euoluing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (footnote omitted).
66. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 15,
§§ 16-6 to -18. Strict scrutiny is also required in cases involving suspect classifications,
see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); however, the suspect class aspect of
equal protection is not relevant to the present discussion. Commentators have described
strict scrutiny as "scrutiny that [is] 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, supra
note 65, at 8.
67. See, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,
188-89 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 & n.*
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
68. See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-30, at 1089:
[T]he all-or-nothing choice between minimum rationality and strict scrutiny illsuits the broad range of situations arising under the equal protection clause,
many of which are best dealt with neither through the virtual rubber-stamp of
truly minimal review nor through the virtual death blow of truly strict scrutiny,
but through methods more sensitive to risks of injustice than the former and yet
less blind to the needs of governmental flexibility than the latter.
69. See supra notes 65-66.
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quires closer scrutiny of the competing interests involved in the
particular case. 70 The Court applies this intermediate level of review to cases involving differential treatment of sensitive (as opposed to "suspect") classes and important (as opposed to "fundamental") individual interests, or to cases indirectly affecting
constitutionally preferred interests. 71
The right of sexual privacy is arguably an important, if not
fundamental, individual interest; therefore, any law· which infringes on this interest should be subject to the middle-tier approach. 72 Indeed, the Supreme Court used this intermediate
level of analysis in Eisenstadt v. Baird73 to invalidate a prohibition on contraception as violating the rights of single persons
under the equal protection clause. 74 Reading Eisenstadt with a
reasonable interpretation of Griswold 75 shows the Court's use of
an interesting chain of reasoning: even if the state could otherwise ban contraception on morality grounds, it may not prohibit
distribution of contraceptives to married persons, as this would
violate the marital privacy. However, since any moral evil caused
by use of contraceptives would be identical whether such use
was by married or unmarried couples, a ban on distribution of
contraceptives to single, but not married, couples impermissibly
violates the equal protection clause. Therefore, the state may
not ban distribution of contraceptives on morality grounds at
70. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Casualty Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1972); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971). See also L.
TRIBE, supra note 15, §§ 16-30 to -31.
71. See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-31.
72. See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 15-20. "[W]hatever the threshold of harm the state
must otherwise establish to justify intruding upon an aspect of personhood in the public
realm, the required threshold is significantly higher when the conduct occurs in a place,
or under circumstances, that the individuals involved justifiably regard as private." Id. at
985. In fact, the Supreme Court has come close to recognizing a fundamental right to
sexual privacy. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child."). But see supra note 32; see also L. TRIBE,
supra note 15, § 15-13, at 944 n.12.
73. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
74. Although the majority opinion purports to apply the rational basis standard, see,
e.g., 405 U.S. at 447 & n.7, the scrutiny actually exercised is more intense than that
which is articulated. See Gunther, supra note 65, at 34-36. This point is reinforced by
the fact that the Court in Eisenstadt draws its version of the equal protection test from
a passage it quotes from Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). Although in Reed the
Court also purported to apply the rational basis test, it has subsequently indicated that
in Reed it actually applied what has become known as the "middle-tier" test. See Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Gunther, supra note 65, at 34. Hence, it is
this middle-tier test that the Court in Eisenstadt actually used. 405 U.S. at 446-47.
75. See supra notes 16-32 and accompanying text.
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all.76
The Court in Eisenstadt went on to make it clear that even if
the state could prohibit distribution of contraceptives to married
persons but chose not to, it could not outlaw distribution to unmarried persons. The evil, as perceived by the state, would in
each case be identical; therefore, the underinclusion 77 would be
invidious. 78 By this analysis, the Court expresses a desire to perform more than cursory equal protection analysis when the right
of privacy is involved; 79 although not utilizing a full strict scrutiny test, the Court is unwilling merely to defer to legislative
judgment.
This intermediate scrutiny test should be applied to regulations of police officers' off-duty, private sexual conduct. Under
this test, for a law or regulation to withstand constitutional challenge, it first must serve an important governmental objective (a
higher standard than the legitimate purpose required by the rational basis test); and, second, it must be substantially (as opposed to reasonably) related to achievement of that objective. 80
The following sections examine the most likely asserted justifications for regulating the private activities of police officers and
conclude that regulation of an officer's off-duty activities cannot
substantially serve any important governmental objectives.
A.

State Interest in Regulating Off-duty Activity to Promote
the Public Morality.

A state may assert many possible justifications for regulating
the off-duty activities of a police officer. However, assuming that
promoting the public morality is an important governmental objective, 81 prohibiting only police officers from engaging in an ac76. 405 U.S. at 453.
77. The equal protection clause guarantees that individuals in similar situations with
regard to the ends of particular legislation will be dealt with in a similar manner. An
underinclusive classification violates this concept of horizontal equity because it includes
some of the people who fit the purpose of the legislation but excludes many others who
are similarly situated. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, supra note 46, at 586-89.
78; 405 U.S. at 454. Even under the lenient, rational basis standard, underinclusiveness will generally serve to invalidate a legislative or administrative mandate. Underinclusive classifications, which do not include all those who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of a law, "burden less than would be logical to achieve the intended
government end." L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-4, at 997; see also Tussman & tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 348-51 (1949).
79. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
80. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
81. See supra text accompanying note 38.

210

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 18:1

tivity solely to protect the public morality would be invidious
classification, since the evil, as perceived by the state, would be
identical whether the activity were engaged in by a public employee or an ordinary citizen. 82 Such underinclusion would be a
violation of equal protection. 83
Nor does the state interest in maintaining a police department
of individuals with the highest possible moral standards satisfy
equal protection requirements. Moral requisites are never easily
defined-if only because of the question of whose moral standards should be used. Even if a majority view could be ascertained, it would hardly be entitled to much force. 84 Hence, although the state has an important interest in prohibiting the
unlawful off-duty conduct of police officers, 85 an activity that society has not deemed sufficiently immoral to be illegal does not
constitute an activity sufficiently immoral to override a police
officer's right to privacy. 86
82. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972). In Eisenstadt, the Court
addressed a legislative division of married and unmarried persons, declaring a state prohibition on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons impermissible. The
Court reasoned that, because the evil inherent in the use of contraceptives would be
identical whether such use was by married or unmarried persons, the underinclusion resulting from this moral bifurcation would be invidious.
83. See supra notes 77-78. While the Court may allow an underinclusive classification
for problems too large, pragmatically, to be remedied all at once, see, e.g., Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a
State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the
problem at all.") (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970)); L. TRIBE,
supra note 15, § 16-4, at 997 ("In defense of underinclusiveness it has been· argued that
piecemeal legislation is a pragmatic means of effecting needed reforms, where a demand
for completeness may lead to total paralysis . . . . ") (citation ommitted); Tussman &
tenBroek, supra, at 349, no compelling reason exists for society to target its battle
against immorality only at police officers. For example, if society deems pre-marital sex
immoral, and if pre-marital sex is not protected by some right of privacy, it would not be
impractical to outlaw all pre-marital sex, rather than merely the pre-marital sex of police
officers.
84. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Many courts are quick to point out
that the states must "tread lightly" when regulating the private actions of their employees and "must be careful not to transform anachronistic notions of unacceptable social
conduct into law." Fabio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 489 Pa. 309, 325, 414 A.2d 82, 90 (1980).
85. The equal protection clause provides no barrier to prohibiting police officers from
doing what the population as a whole may not do. Indeed, subjecting police officers to
additional prohibitions of otherwise illegal conduct is not constitutionally impermissible.
Police officers are charged with upholding the the law. Consequently, a police officer
committing a crime places himself in a position where his interests as an individual and
his interests as an officer will conflict, thereby creating a substantial state interest in
treating police officers different from the general public. Andrad v. City of Phoenix, 692
F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1982).
86. Cf. Risner v. State Personnel Bd. of Review, 56 Ohio App. 2d 21, 27, 381 N.E.2d
346, 350 (1978) (finding that regulation providing for removal of public employees for
"immoral conduct" established no higher standards than those prevalent among the general public).
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Furthermore, even if promotion of morality constitutes an important governmental objective and a valid reason exists for
treating police officers differently from the general public, to the
extent that a "conduct unbecoming an officer" standard prohibits a certain activity, neither the public's (nor even the legislature's) view of morality is imposed, but rather the view of the
officer's superiors. Consequently the standards imposed on police officers will often be quite different from public standards,
and will therefore not be substantially, or even reasonably, related to the important governmental objective.

B. .State Interest in Promoting a High Degree of Respect for
Police Officers
The Supreme Court has made clear that when a state acts as
an employer it may not, without substantial justification, condition employment on the relinquishment of constitutional
rights, 87 and further, that even police officers are entitled to full
protection of these rights. 88 The Court, however, also has indicated that a state may have a greater interest in regulating the
activities of its employees than the activities of the population
at large. 89
87. Pickering v. Board of Educ. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Indeed, "[i]t is well established that terminable-at-will government employees, while they may generally be discharged for any number of reasons or for no reason at all, may not be discharged for
exercising their constitutional rights." McMullan v. Carson, 568 F. Supp. 937, 943 (M.D.
Fla. 1983) (citing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 514-16 (1980)).
88. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) ("policemen ... are not relegated
to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.")
89. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (holding that regulation establishing
hair grooming standards for police officers does not violate the fourteenth amendment,
because the choice reflected in the regulation that similarity in appearance is desirable-whether based on a desire to make police officers readily recognizable to the public
or on a desire [or the esprit de corps which such similarity may inculcate-is rationally
justified).
Neither of the proposed justifications in Kelley applies to intrusion upon the private
sexual conduct of police officers. First, nothing a police officer does in private will affect
the public's ability to recognize him or her on duty. Second, the esprit de corps the Court
discussed in Kelley arose from a similarity of appearance while on-duty, not from a similarity of life-style choices. For example, the Court would likely not uphold a regulation
requiring dismissal of all unmarried officers in order to promote an esprit de corps. Furthermore, it is impermissible to attempt to enforce the department's majority morality
upon individual officers. See supra notes 41, 84 and accompanying text.
Finally, to the extent that the Court in Kelley recognized the State's interest in conducting its internal affairs, 425 U.S. at 247, regulation of officer appearance (i.e. hair
grooming) for on-duty police officers constitutes a proper area for state intervention,
while regulation of off-duty sexual conduct does not.
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Several lower courts assert an overriding state interest in promoting a high degree of respect for police officers in order to
facilitate the officers' ability to perform their function. 90 Often
courts worry about a weakening of public confidence and trust. 91
However, promoting a high degree of respect for police officers is
not a sufficiently important governmental objective to support
intrusion into the police officer's off-duty, private activities. Although cases upholding the disciplining of police officers may assert to be premised on a loss of community respect for the officer, the underlying rationale is actually based on this lack of
respect coupled with some form of immoral behavior. 92 It is hard
to believe that a court would uphold dismissal of an officer in a
case where lack of respect was not based on some form of "immorality."93 Yet imposition of a majority view of moral conduct
is an impermissible reason to impinge on the police officer's ability to engage in otherwise lawful off-duty conduct. 94
Furthermore, to justify state regulation, a substantial connection would have to exist between the police officer's off-duty
conduct and a weakening of the public confidence. Because what
one does in private, by definition, generally will not come before
the public eye, government interference serves no justifiable
purpose but merely imposes a concept of private morality chosen by the state. 911 Indeed, if factors exist which contribute to
the belief that sexual activity is a vital component of protected
personhood, then, to the extent such factors do not depend on
90. See Faust v. Police Civil Serv. Comm'n, 22 Pa. Commw. 123, 127, 347 A.2d 765,
768 (1975) (holding that adultery, committed by a police officer while he was off-duty
constituted "immorality" and "conduct unbecoming an officer" and warranted dismissal
even though adultery was not a criminal act in the state of Pennsylvania).
91. Faust v. Police Civil Serv. Comm'n, 22 Pa. Commw. 123, 127, 347 A.2d 765, 76869 (1975) (quoting Cerceo v. Darby, 3 Pa. Commw. 174, 183, 281 A.2d 251, 255 (1971));
McMullen v. Carson, 568 F. Supp. 937,944 (M.D. Fla. 1983) ("[P]olice departments have
an important governmental interest in maintaining public confidence in the police force
and public respect for its officers.") (citation omitted).
92. For example, in upholding the dismissal of a police officer for adultery (behavior
which was otherwise legal in the state), the court in Faust v. Police Civil Serv. Comm'n,
22 Pa. Commw. 123, 347 A.2d 765 (1975), relied in large part on the fact that "a great
portion of our citizenry still believes [adultery) to be morally offensive." Id. at 127, 347
A.2d at 769.
93. For example, one can imagine a conservative small community that would not be
favorably disposed to its male police chief taking ballet lessons. Yet it is hard to believe
that a court would allow disciplining of the officer based on a loss of respect or confidence resulting from his engaging in this activity.
94. See supra notes 41, 84 and accompanying text.
95. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,490,415 N.E.2d 936,941,434 N.Y.S.2d 947,952
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); accord State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 218-20,
381 A.2d 333, 341-43 (1977).
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some narrow definition of privacy, 96 failure to seal sexual activity hermetically from public view provides no basis for state intrusion into the private sex lives of police officers. 97 This is true
"[e]ven when the harm feared has existence independent of the
beholder's awareness of the offending conduct,"98 as may be the
case when the state is concerned with public opinion of its police
officers. If a public finding of certain off-duty sexual conduct as
offensive to contemplate is enough to justify regulatory prohibition of such conduct then no aspect of the individual's privacy is
safe from regulation and the notion of protected personhood is
nothing more than a hollow shell. 99
Finally, because public expectations influence public confidence, an intrusion upon a police officer's private, off-duty activities in order to promote public confidence raises a serious policy
concern. In today's society, some police officers will engage in
off-duty sexual conduct even in the face of prohibiting regulations. 100 Public confidence in the police department will be more
shaken if police officers engage in such conduct in violation of
regulations than if no such regulations exist. Both the public at
large and police officers themselves will acquire a general disrespect for regulations which prohibit what might otherwise be
pervasive conduct. 101 To the extent that this occurs, any regulation of otherwise lawful, off-duty activity promulgated to promote public trust in the police department will be self-defeating.

C.

State Interest in Ensuring the Proper Functioning of the
Police Department

Some courts assert that, to justify controlling the private, offduty conduct of a police officer, a governing body must show
that his or her "usefulness as a police officer would be substan96. L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 15-13, at 947-48. For example, the doctor's involvement in Griswold in the couple's decision on contraception did not cause them to forfeit
their constitutional protection. Id.
97. Accord Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849
(1962) (finding that the right of privacy required dismissal of charge in consensual act
between two men seen through a hole in the ceiling of a store toilet stall).
98. L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 15-20, at 984.
99. Cf. id., § 15-19, at 981 ("If simply finding another's appearance or habits offensive
to hear, see, or think about were enough to justify exclusionary regulation, rights of personhood . . . would be at an end.").
100. Cf. Kadish, The Crisis of Ouercriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157, 159-60 (1967).
101. Id. at 160 ("Moral adjudications vulnerable to a charge of hypocrisy are selfdefeating no less in Jaw than elsewhere.").
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tially and materially impaired by the conduct in question." 102
This view has the advantage of both an important governmental
objective (to promote order and safety through a wellfunctioning police department), and a substantial connection between the classification and the purpose of the statute. 103 However, this connection loses any semblance of reasonableness unless the regulation requires disciplining a police officer only for
private, off-duty, sexual conduct that has an actual-rather than
possible-substantial effect on the officer's inherent ability to
perform. 10" Otherwise the regulation contains no effective limit
on the aspects of the police officer's private life that may be regulated by the state-all off-duty activity has some possible effect
on on-duty performance.
Recognition of the need for a direct connection between the
102. Smith v. Price, 446 F. Supp. 828, 834 (W.D. Ga. 1977), rev'd on other grounds,
616 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980); accord Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449,
459 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
103. It may be useful to compare the line of teacher dismissal cases, in which the
courts are called upon to determine whether a teacher's sexual conduct constitutes sufficient grounds for dismissal or suspension under a statute prohibiting "immoral conduct."
While some courts have held that a teacher's inability to obey the law or otherwise act
in accordance with traditional moral principles may alone be grounds for dismissal, Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 29, 36, 513 P.2d 889, 894, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670
(1973), many others declare that dismissal may not be based on unfitness absent proof
that retention "poses a significant danger of harm to either students, school employees,
or others who might be affected by [one's) actions as a teacher." Morrison v. State Bd.
of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 235, 461 P.2d 375, 391, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 191 (1969) (emphasis
added). In other words, a teacher's private sexual conduct becomes a proper concern only
to the extent that it directly and negatively affects his or her abilities as a teacher.
Jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 12 Ohio Misc. 288, 291,
233 N.E.2d 143, 146 (1967). Where the teacher's abilities are unaffected and the school
faces no danger, the teacher's private sexual activities are his or her own business and
should not be the basis of dismissal or suspension. Id.; Reinhardt v. Board of Educ., 19
Ill. App. 3d 481, 485, 311 N.E.2d 710, 713 (1974) (holding that dismissal is proper "only
where the record shows harm to pupils, faculty, or the school itself'), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 61 Ill. 2d 101, 329 N.E.2d 218 (1975); see also Jerry v. Board
of Educ., 35 N.Y.2d 534,324 N.E.2d 106, 364 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1974) (holding that teacher's
private association with a member of the opposite sex is not by itself a concern of the
school unless the school board demonstrates that such association may interfere with the
teacher's responsibilites to students and ability to teach); accord Sullivan v. Meade lndep. School Dist., 530 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976).
104. More and more courts are apparently recognizing this fact. See L. TRIBE supra
note 15, § 15-13, at 942 n.3 ("The courts have increasingly put public agencies to the test
of proving a tangible and non-trivial connection between alleged 'immorality' and the
employee's ineffectiveness in performing his or her duties.") (emphasis added); see also
Perea v. Fales, 39 Cal. App. 3d 939, 942, 114 Cal. Rptr. 808, 810 (1974) (A "nexus between conduct characterized as 'unbecoming an officer' and fitness to perform the functions of a police officer is required for the suspension of an officer from duty.") (citation
omitted); accord Boussom v. City of Elkhart, 567 F. Supp. 1382, 1384 (N.D. Ind. 1983)
(A police oficer cannot "be removed if the cause for dismissal bears no reasonable relation to [his] fitness or capacity to ,hold his position.") (citation omitted).
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off-duty activity and the deterioration in performance eliminates
the need to examine the underlying off-duty activity. The state
tries to prevent the evil of poor performance; but poor performance can, and indeed should, be prohibited, regardless of its
cause. Punishing poor performance when it results from certain
activities but not when it results from others creates an invidious classification and the underinclusion violates the equal protection clause. 1011
In sum, state intrusion into the private, off-duty sexual conduct of police officers serves no important governmental objective. Consequently, intruding regulations cannot clear the equal
protection hurdles necessary to constitute a valid exercise of the
state's power. The fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause thus protects police officers' otherwise legal, private, offduty, consensual, sexual conduct from state intrusion.

III.

VAGUENESS DOCTRINE AND THE CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN
OFFICER STANDARD

Even if the state has some justifiable interest in regulating the
private, off-duty, sexual activities of police officers, the question
remains whether a statute or regulation using a "conduct unbecoming an officer" or similar standard is drawn sufficiently
narrowly to meet the notice requirement of the due process
clause. 106 The vagueness doctrine compels the legislature to promulgate clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers
of fact, to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of
statutes and regulations, 107 and to provide fair warning of pro105. See supra notes 77-78; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 15-13, at 942 n.3
("[T]he particular attention courts have given to employment decisions based on private
sexual conduct arguably evidences a perception that such a factor is not merely extraneous but is invidious.")
106. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1925), quoted in Bence v.
Breier, 501 F.2d 1188, 1187 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1121 (1974) ("[A]
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates the first essential of due process of law.").
107. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 556, 572-73 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTI, CRIMINAL LAW, 87-88 (1972); see also
Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 104 S. Ct. 404 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting), denying cert.
sub nom. to Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1983):
By demanding that government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of
clarity, the Due Process Clause ensures that state power will be exercised only
on behalf of policies reflecting a conscious choice among competing social values;
reduces the danger of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the
laws; and permits meaningful judical review of state actions.
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scribed conduct. 108
Although some courts allow a finding of misconduct to be
based solely upon the violation of implicit standards of good behavior imposed upon those who stand in the public eye as upholders of that which is morally and legally correct, 109 most
courts upholding prohibitions of "conduct unbecoming an officer" are not as permissive of such a broad standard and admit
that it may indeed appear vague on its face. no These courts assert that this standard nevertheless withstands constitutional
challenge because it has been narrowed by custom, usage, and
judicial interpretation so that it gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that it forbids his contemplated conduct. m
104 S. Ct. at 407.
108. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (acknowledging the importance of fair warning, the Court said that when a man remains free to choose between
lawful and unlawful conduct, the law must "give the person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly."); W.
LAFAVE & A. Sco'M', supra note 107, at 85-87. But see Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the
Federal Courts, 26 STAN. L. REV. 855, 857 n.14 (1974) ("To the extent that it can be
shown that few people actually rely on the state of the law at the time they act, the fair
warning rationale is undercut.").
109. See Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Livingston, 22 Ariz. App. 183, 525 P.2d 949, 953-54
(1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 951 (1975).
110. Fabio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 489 Pa. 309, 315-16, 414 A.2d 82, 85-86 (1980);
Perea v. Fales, 39 Cal. App. 3d 939, 942, 114 Cal. Rptr. 808, 810 (1974) ("The expression
'conduct unbecoming an officer' fails, on its face, to provide a standard.").
111. Fabio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 489 Pa. 309, 315-16, 414 A.2d 82, 85-86 (1980). In
Fabio, the court relied on three factors in determining that the standard had been sufficiently narrowed over time. First, the phrase "conduct unbecoming an officer" has been
continuously and successfully used as a military standard since the 18th century. Second,
the Supreme Court upheld a similar standard (in a military setting) against a challenge
of vagueness in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). Third, the courts of the state had
ruled upon specific types of behavior which they had deemed to be unbecoming conduct.
489 Pa. at 315-17, 414 A.2d at 85-86.
Military precedents have no application in the civilian context, making the first two
factors of the court's decision irrelevant to regulation of police officers. Bence v. Breier,
501 F.2d 1185, 1192 (7th Cir. 1974); accord Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 756. Additionally,
the imprecision of any military-civilian police analogy precludes its use in the determination of constitutional rights. Muller v. Conslisk, 429 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1970).
The third factor factor relied on by the Fabio court-previous state court rulings that
specific types of behavior constituted unbecoming conduct-does little to alleviate the
vagueness of the prohibition, since the regulation remains vague as to the propriety of
conduct which has not yet been the subject of litigation. Furthermore, to the extent that
a "conduct unbecoming an officer" standard tracks the morals of the community over
time, conduct that was once allowed under the standard may at any time become prohibited and vice versa, indicating that past judicial decisions will provide less than perfect
guidance.
It is important to note that the articulated standard need only give notice to those
potentially subject to consequences under the rule. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note
107, at 85. Hence, "the required certainty may be provided by the common knowledge of
members of the particular vocation when the regulation does not itself contain specific
standards; it may be that police officers 'will normally be able to determine what kind of
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These courts fail to consider several factors which should invalidate "conduct unbecoming an officer" and similar standards
even if they have been somewhat narrowed over time. First, such
a standard "still does not provide the individual with meaningful guidance concerning the required mode of conduct." 112 Even
though ascertainable areas of permissible and nonpermissible
behavior may exist, under such a vague standard conduct will
always exist that will not fit easily into either category. 113 Consequently, the standard does not provide an officer sufficient notice of just what conduct is prohibited. 11 •
Second, the subjectivity implicit in the language of the rule
still allows police officials unfettered discretion in enforcement, 116 substantially decreasing the possibility of even-handed
application. 116 This potential for arbitrary enforcement is abhorrent to the due process clause. 117
conduct indicates unfitness' to work in law enforcement." Perea v. Fales, 39 Cal. App. 3d
939, 942, 114 Cal. Rptr. 808, 810 (1974) (citation omitted).
112. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Pitlock, 44 Mich. App. 410, 414, 205 N.W.2d 293, 294-5
(1973); accord Note, supra note 108, ai 865 ("[T]he Supreme Court and lower federal
courts have voided for failure to afford fair warning generally applicable criminal and
civil statutes penalizing . . . 'misconduct,' conduct that is 'annoying,' 'reprehensible,' or
'improper,' 'immoral' or 'demoralizing,' 'offensive,' and 'prejudicial to the best interests'
of a city.") (footnotes omitted); see also supra note 111.
113. If there were no gray area there would be no need for a "conduct unbecoming an
officer" standard-all prohibited behavior would be known and could be specifically prohibited. To be sure, the level of vagueness permitted will be governed in part by the
extent to which the context creates a necessity for imprecise regulation, Note, supra note
108, at 860, but the requirement of specificity has been found infeasible only on rare
occasion. Cf. id. at 863 n.37. Furthermore, while it is inevitable that there will be some
degree of uncertainty in applying any prohibitory statute or regulation, W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTT, supra note 107, at 84-85, the need for the protection afforded by the vagueness
doctrine increases "where the uncertainty induced by the statute threatens to inhibit the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-91
(1979) (citations omitted). Consequently, to the extent that a "conduct unbecoming an
officer" or similar regulatory prohibition may infringe upon the individual's constitutional right of privacy (whatever that right might be) or upon his or her right to equal
protection, the regulation is subject to the strictest standard of permissible vagueness.
114. See supra notes 106, 108 and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance of notice.
115. Bence v. Breier, 501 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1974). The officer's superiors, after
all, will decide whether to fire, demote or suspend the officer for engaging in "misconduct" or to do nothing at all.
116. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes
of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and
the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 221 (1967).
117. Bence v. Breier, 501 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1974). Of course, this does not
mean that a rule "is void merely because it grants some discretion to those who administer" it. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 107, at 88. "Uncertain statutory language has
been upheld when the subject matter would not allow more exactness and when greater
specificity in language would interfere with practical administration." Id. (footnotes
omitted). But regulation of off-duty police conduct is not a context that creates a neces-
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Finally, because a "conduct unbecoming an officer" or similar
rule contains no standards, the result of administrative and judicial review will be arbitrary, comprising, at best, nothing more
than a meaningless gesture. us The vagueness doctrine fundamentally guards against this possibility. n 9
In short, because a "conduct unbecoming an officer" standard
provides no guidance to those it regulates, enables arbitrary enforcement by police officials, and does not set appropriate standards for review, the courts should not uphold this standard.
Those who assert the need for a broad standard, because of the
impossibility of regulating specifically against all relevant activities, and who then assert that the "conduct unbecoming an officer" rule has been sufficiently narrowed by the courts to provide fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that the
regulation forbids contemplated conduct, state conflicting propositions. If an individual can know all forbidden conduct, a regulation can specifically prohibit such activities. Broad standards
are, therefore, neither a necessary nor a desirable way to enforce
proper behavior and should be struck down.
CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, the courts have almost uniformly overlooked
the equal protection inquiry suggested by this Note. They focus
exclusively on due process reasoning regardless of outcome. This
view, perhaps promoted by the Supreme Court's unwillingness
or inability to make a definitive statement on the bounds of the
constitutional right of privacy, is entirely backward. The due
process clause alone affords scant protection to the private sexual activities of police officers. The barrier erected by the equal
protection clause, however, should no longer be ignored. The
courts should apply equal protection analysis when confronted
with problems of regulation of off-duty police conduct.
Even if the state has an interest in regulating the private, offduty sexual activities of its police officers substantial enough to
clear the equal protection hurdles, any regulation must be drawn
narrowly enough to meet the notice requirement of the due process clause. "Conduct unbecoming an officer" and similar stansity for imprecise standards. See supra note 113, Rather, such regulations embody a
clear attempt to exercise state power without making a conscious choice among competing social values and therefore violate the due process clause. See supra note 107.
118. Bence v. Breier, 501 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1974).
119. See supra note 107.
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<lards do not meet this criterion and are therefore impermissible.
While society may depend on its police officers to enforce the
rules which protect both its citizens and its structure, any tendency to view police officers only as public servants and not as a
part of the society must be resisted. When a police officer is in
off-duty garb, he or she is entitled to the safeguards and privileges available to any citizen. Indeed, allowing the state to strip
the rights of an individual who has honorably chosen to serve
society is allowing it to punish the individual who is most worthy_ of praise. Courts must therefore be especially zealous in applying equal protection and vagueness doctrines to regulations of
police officers' off-duty activities.

-Michael A. Woronoff

